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INTRODUCTION
On several recent occasions, Harvey Pitt, then acting
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
discussed the importance of proxy voting disclosure by
investment advisers and mutual funds to ensure that such
fiduciary obligations are performed in the best interests of their
clients/shareholders.' On September 20, 2002, the SEC acted on
Chairman Pitt's concerns by introducing two proposals.2 One
Vice President/Attorney of the Legal Advisory Department and Anti-Money
Laundering Officer of Merrill Lynch Investment Managers, L.P. B.A., 1992,
College of William & Mary; J.D., 1999, Villanova University School of Law;
formerly Associate in the Financial Services, Bankruptcy and Restructuring
Departments of Reed Smith LLP. The author gratefully acknowledges the
contribution of Fabio Battaglia, Assistant Vice President of Merrill Lynch
Investment Managers, L.P., in the preparation of this article.
1. See Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, Speech by SEC Chairman: Remarks Before
the Investment Company Institute, 2002 General Membership Meeting (May 24,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch562.htm (last visited
Sept 10, 2003); Letter from Harvey L. Pitt, SEC Chairman, to John P. M. Higgins,
President, RAM Trust Services (Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Pitt, Remarks],
available at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/special/pitt/pitt-higgins.pdf
(last visited Sept 10, 2003).
2. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records By
Registered Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act
Release No. 25739, 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 274 (Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter
Investment Company Proxy Release Proposal]; Proxy Voting By Investment
Advisors, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2059, 17 C.F.R. § 275 (Sept. 20,
2002) [hereinafter Investment Adviser Proxy Release Proposal].
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proposal required open-end and closed-end investment
companies to disclose their proxy voting policies and procedures
as well as actual votes cast relating to portfolio securities they
hold.3 The other proposal required registered investment
advisers (excluding smaller advisers4) that exercise voting
authority over client proxies to adopt and implement proxy
voting policies that meet certain fiduciary standards and to make
certain disclosures to clients concerning the advisers' proxy
voting record.5 On January 23, 2003, after reviewing the most
comment letters in recent SEC rule-making history, the SEC
approved the two proposals, with minor modifications.6
Unfortunately, while providing no practical benefit to investors in
their investment decision-making process, these new rules
effectively impose onerous and costly obligations on funds and
their advisers.
In addition, as pointed out by one investment management
company in a letter to the SEC,
3. See generally Investment Company Proxy Release Proposal, supra note 2.
4. Investment advisers who are exempt from compliance with the SEC's
investment adviser proxy voting disclosure rules include: (i) advisers who are
registered with state securities authorities (i.e. advisers with less than $25
million in total assets under management, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a); and (ii) advisers
relying on Section 203(b) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (i.e. advisers
with 14 or fewer clients in any twelve-month period who do not hold
themselves out generally to the public as investment advisers and who do not
act as investment advisers to registered investment companies, 17 U.S.C. § 80b-
3b). Investment Advisor Proxy Release Proposal, supra note 2, at 11.
5. Investment Advisor Proxy Release Proposal, supra note 2, at 17.
6. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records By
Registered Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act
Release No. 25922, 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 270, 274 Jan.31, 2003) [hereinafter the
Investment Company Proxy Release]; Proxy Voting By Investment Advisors,
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2106, 17 C.F.R. §§ 275 (Jan. 31, 2003)
[hereinafter Investment Advisor Proxy Release]; The SEC received over 8,000
comment letters relating to proxy voting disclosure. The majority of comment
letters (sent by individual investors and past and present labor union
employees) supported the SEC's proposals. By and large, financial services
firms approved of disclosing proxy voting policies and procedures but
vigorously opposed disclosure of actual votes. Investment Company Proxy
Release, at 17.
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[T]hese proposals are inconsistent with the concept of a
mutual fund whereby individual investors pool their
investments into a common vehicle and delegate investment
management and administration to the fund's investment
manager and corporate oversight to the fund's Board of
Directors. The mutual fund vehicle was not intended to be a
substitute for, or operate as, a separately managed account for
each investor. In the latter case, the investor receives
individual advice on a portfolio of securities and has beneficial
ownership in each of those securities. As a result, the investor
also has the right to direct the voting of the proxies of each
company held in that portfolio.7
I. BACKGROUND
Federal securities laws and regulations do not currently
regulate how investment advisers vote proxies on behalf of
clients. The SEC has previously considered the issue of proxy
voting disclosure on two separate occasions (in 1971 and 1978),
but ultimately withdrew the proposed rules.8 However, as
former Chairman Pitt noted,
7. Letter from Brian T. Zino, President, J. & W. Seligman & Co.
Incorporated to Jonathon G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Dec. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/btzino1.htm (last visited Sept
10, 2003).
8. More recently, in July 1978, the SEC proposed Rule 14a-3(b)-11, under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which would have required certain
institutions to disclose their proxy voting policies and procedures as well as
certain information about actual proxy votes (although not every actual vote).
Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance
Generally, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14970 at II.B (July 18, 1978). The
Commission subsequently withdrew the proposal, in part, in response to
concerns that it would have applied to only some institutional investors and
not others, such as banks and pension plans. See Shareholder Communications,
Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate
Governance Generally, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15385 (Dec. 6,
1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 58533 (Dec. 14, 1978).
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[An investment adviser must exercise its responsibility to
vote the shares of its clients in a manner that is consistent with
the general antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, as well as its fiduciary duties under federal and
state law to act in the best interests of its clients. 9
Despite these fiduciary standards, former Chairman Pitt,
together with certain labor and socially responsible investing
organizations, pressed for explicit regulation of mutual fund and
investment adviser proxy voting activities. 10 In the Investment
Company Proxy Release, the SEC determined that the required
disclosure of a fund's proxy voting policies and actual votes is
intended to enable "shareholders to monitor their funds'
involvement in the governance activities of portfolio companies"
which, in turn, will encourage funds to become more engaged in
9. Pitt, Remarks, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., Rulemaking Petition letter from Amy Domini, Domini Social
Investments, LLC to Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Nov. 27, 2001), available at
http://www.domini.com/common/pdf/SEC-Letter.pdf (last visited Sept 10,
2003); Rulemaking Petition letter from C. Thomas Keegel, General Secretary-
Treasurer, International Brotherhood of Teamsters to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, Securitities and Exchange Commission (Jan. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.funddemocracy.com/Teamsters%20Petition.htm (last visited
Sept. 10, 2003); Rulemaking Petition letter from Richard L. Trumka, American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.funddemocracy.com/AFL-CIO%20Petition.htm (last visited Sept.
10, 2003); Rulemaking Petition letter from Richard L. Trumka, American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations to Harvey L. Pitt,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, (July 30, 2002), available at
http://www.aflcio.org.
In late November 2003, several months after the adoption of the
Investment Company Proxy Release, and in the wake of recent mutual fund
scandals involving market-timing and late-trading transactions, the U.S. House
of Representatives passed the Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee Transparency
Act of 2003 (the "MFIFTA"). If unchanged by the U.S. Senate, section 109 of
MFIFTA would codify disclosure of actual proxy votes by registered
investment companies by amending section 30 of the Investment Company Act
of 1940. As of the date of this Article, the U.S> Senate has not acted on this
matter and is not scheduled currently to do so until at least January 2004.
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portfolio company governance activities." The SEC's expectation
is that increased shareholder activity with respect to mutual
funds can have a potential "dramatic impact on shareholder
value" and the value of capital market investors at large.12
However, except for citing statistics which demonstrate the
growth and widespread popularity of mutual funds13, the SEC
failed to set forth specific facts supporting these assertions.
Strikingly, the SEC did not proffer any evidence that funds and
investment advisers vote in a manner that undermines the value
of a portfolio company. On the contrary, fund advisers have
every reason to vote in a manner that will enhance the value of
portfolio companies. Few would argue that the compensation
and success of an investment adviser typically depends on the
adviser's ability to increase the value of its clients' holdings.
In addition, the SEC asserted that requiring disclosure of
proxy voting activities could "illuminate potential conflicts of
interest and discourage voting that is inconsistent with fund
shareholders' best interests."'14 Again, the SEC failed to buttress
this argument by citing examples of investment advisers
improperly exercising their proxy voting power on behalf of
client funds.
One probable explanation for the lack of evidence
demonstrating the need for proxy voting disclosure regulation is
that the proxy voting proposals were precipitated by extraneous
factors that extend way beyond the above-cited reasons. Indeed,
the Investment Company Proxy Release contains a specific
acknowledgment by the SEC that the recent corporate scandals
(such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco,
etc.) underscore the need for an increased role by mutual funds in
corporate governance. 5 The release not so subtly implied that if
mutual funds were to play a more active role in "monitoring the
stewardship" of the companies in which they invest, such
11. See Investment Company Proxy Release, supra note 6, at 6.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 5-6.
14. Id. at 17.
15. See id. at 11-12.
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scandals could be prevented.16 The final rules place an
inappropriate burden on mutual funds and advisers, neither of
which has been associated in any way with the types of
accounting scandals that have contributed to decreasing investor
confidence and inundated the media. Most issues on which
funds' portfolio companies seek shareholder approval are not the
types of issues that would have prevented the corporate frauds of
which shareholders, including mutual funds, legitimately
complain. For example, as a general matter, shareholders are not
asked to approve officer compensation packages or particular
acquisitions or dispositions of subsidiaries or derivative
securities.
II. INVESTMENT COMPANY PROXY RELEASE
A. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies
The final rule requires open-end and closed-end funds that
invest in "voting securities" to include in their statements of
additional information (SAI) a description of their proxy voting
policies and procedures. 17 Annual and semi-annual reports of
open-end and closed-end funds are required to disclose that the
proxy voting policies are available electronically or upon
request. 8 Additionally, closed-end funds are required to describe
their proxy voting policies annually on newly adopted Form N-
CSR.19
B. Scope of Proxy Voting Disclosure
The final rules specifically require that the description of
proxy voting policies include a discussion of policies used for
votes that present "a conflict of interest between the interests of
16. See id. at 12.
17. See id. at Form N-1A, Item 13() and Form N-2, Item 18.16.
18. See id. at Form N-1A, Item 22(b)(7), Item 22(c)(5); Form N-2, Item 23,
Instructions 4.g and 5.e.
19. See id. at Form N-CSR, Item 7.
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[flund shareholders, on the one hand, and those of the [f]und's
investment adviser, principal underwriter or any affiliated person
of the [f]und, its investment adviser, or its principal underwriter
on the other."20 Further, if the fund elects to delegate its proxy
voting obligations to its investment adviser (or another third
party) and the adviser (or other third party) uses its own policies
in making voting decisions on behalf of the fund, the final rules
require disclosure of a description of the adviser's (or third
party's) policies.21
Moreover, based on the Investment Company Proxy Release,
the SEC expects that the description of the proxy voting policies
include disclosure of:
i) The extent to which a fund delegates its proxy voting
decisions to its investment adviser or another third party, or relies
on recommendations of a third party;
ii) Policies and procedures relating to matters that may affect
substantially the rights or privileges of the holders of securities to
be voted; and
iii) Policies regarding the extent to which the proxy voting
policies support or give weight to the views of management of a
portfolio company.22
The SEC also expects the disclosure to cover the proxy voting
policies' treatment of more specific corporate governance matters
(e.g., changes to capital structure, stock option plans, corporate
governance matters and social and corporate responsibility
issues).23
C. Proxy Voting Record Disclosure
Open-end and closed-end funds will be required to file their
proxy voting records annually on newly adopted Form N-PX (for
the twelve-month period ended June 30, by no later than August
20. Id. at Form N-1A, Item 22(b)(7) , Item 22(c)(5); Form N-2, Item 23,
Instructions 4.g and 5.e.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id. at 22.
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31 of each year).24 The proxy voting record must include the
following information as to each matter considered at a fund
portfolio company's shareholder meeting: (a) issuer's name; (b)
exchange ticker symbol of the portfolio security; (c) CUSIP
number of the portfolio security; (d) shareholder meeting date; (e)
brief identification of the matter voted on; (f) whether the matter
was proposed by the issuer or by a security holder; (g) how the
fund cast its vote (e.g., for or against the proposal, or abstain); (h)
whether the fund cast its vote for or against management; and (i)
whether the fund cast its vote on the matter.2 5 Disclosure related
to whether a fund failed to vote a particular proxy may
potentially expose a fund to liability as plaintiffs' lawyers use this
information to support allegations of breaches of fiduciary duty
by a fund and/or its adviser to shareholders. As a result, in order
to minimize a fund's exposure to potential liability, funds and
their advisers will most likely attempt to vote on every item with
respect to all proxies.
Fortunately, the SEC did not incorporate into the Investment
Company Proxy Release its proposal requiring shareholder
reports to include detailed disclosure regarding any votes cast
during the reporting period that were inconsistent with the
fund's proxy voting policies.26 Without a doubt, this disclosure
would have increased a fund's exposure to claims alleging
misleading prospectus disclosure (because the 'inconsistent' vote
cast would be in violation of the proxy voting policies disclosed
in the fund's SAI).
For obvious practical reasons, the proxy voting record
disclosures represent the most onerous portion of the proposals.
Although funds and their advisers record how they vote proxies
for each of their portfolio securities, the comprehensive data for
each proxy required to be assembled and maintained for the
reporting period will require firms to expend significant amounts
24. See id. at Form N-PX, General Instruction A.
25. See id. at Form N-PX, Item 1.
26. See id. at Form N-1A, Item 22(b)(8) and Item 22(c)(6); Form N-2, Item
23.4.h and Item 23.5.f.
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of time, finances, technology and other resources.27 In particular,
third party proxy service providers already perform this task for
several of the larger mutual fund complexes. Even if the
investment adviser concludes that certain matters considered at a
shareholder meeting are clearly insignificant as to both the fund's
net asset value and the market value of the company this
information will still have to be assembled, formatted and
maintained for a period not less than five years.28
D. Proposed Modifications to the Investment Company Proxy Release
While few would balk at the reasonableness of a requirement
to disclose proxy voting policies (and most fund complexes and
investment advisers did not oppose this requirement29),
mandating disclosure of a fund's proxy voting record appears to
be far less valuable because of the irrelevancy of most, if not all,
of the information to the investor.30 Undoubtedly, these records
are less relevant to investors than records of a fund's portfolio
27. Letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, Investment Company
Institute to Nathan Knuffman, Desk Officer, Securities and Exchange
Commission Office of Management and Budget, and Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, at II.B. (Mar. 13, 2003), available
at
http://www.ici.org/statements/cmltr/03-sec.proxy-est-com.html#P2610412
(last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
28. Id.
29. See Statement from Matthew P. Fink, President, Investment Company
Institute, ICI Issues Statement on SEC Proxy Vote Disclosure Rule (Jan. 23,
2003) ("The mutual fund industry supports the SEC's rules requiring funds to:
adopt proxy voting polices; adopt procedures that guide their voting in
potential conflict situations; disclose their policies and procedures to the SEC
and fund shareholders; and retain proxy voting records for SEC examiners"),
available at
http://www.ici.org/issues/dis/03_news-proxy-final.html (last visited Sept.
10, 2003).
30. See Letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, Investment Company
Institute to Jonathon G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission,
at VI.A.1. (Dec. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.ici.org/issues/dis/02_se4proxycom.html#P49_19884 (last
visited Sept. 10, 2003).
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securities transactions or of violations of codes of ethics
(information as to both are not currently disclosed to investors).
1. Role of Directors
For more than twenty years the SEC has consistently looked
to independent directors as arbiters of conflicts of interest. In
prior rule-making proposals and speeches, the SEC has
repeatedly stated that independent directors are the watchdogs
for fund investors and their primary role is to police potential
conflicts of interest.31 Accordingly, the SEC has relied upon
directors to protect funds and their shareholders from potential
conflicts of interest in numerous areas, such as affiliated
transactions.32 Indeed, after the SEC adopted rules and rule
amendments to enhance the independence and effectiveness of
fund directors in early 2001, 33 the staff indicated its intention to
rely even more heavily on directors to police possible conflicts of
interest.34 The SEC has not suggested nor does the investment
31. See, e.g., Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 24082, 17 C.F.R. § §239, 240, 270, 274
(Oct. 14, 1999) at 16 ("independent directors play an important role in
representing and guarding the interests of investors. As has been stated many
times, Congress intended these directors to be 'independent watchdogs' for
investors and to 'supply an independent check on management."') (citations
omitted).
32. See Paul Roye, Director, Division of Investment Management, Securities
and Exchange Commission, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks Before the Securities
Law Developments Conference Investment Company Institute Education
Foundation (Dec. 9, 1999) ("Historically, the Commission's exemptive rules and
orders, particularly those permitting transactions between a fund and its
affiliates, have relied to a significant degree on the oversight provided by the
fund's board, and especially its independent directors."), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch336.htm (last
visited Sept. 10, 2003).
33. See Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 24816, 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 240, 270, 274
(Jan. 2, 2001).
34. See Paul Roye, Director, Division of Investment Management, Securities
and Exchange Commission, Speech by SEC Staff: Mutual Fund and Investment
Management Conference (March 19, 2001):
2003] PROXY DISCLOSURE RULES & MUTUAL FUNDS 243
management community believe that proxy voting raises conflict
of interest concerns that are greater than those in areas in which
the SEC or the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "1940 Act")
already relies primarily on fund directors to police conflicts of
interest.35 Surprisingly, the SEC's two proxy voting disclosure
proposals and the subsequent final rules are silent as to an
enhanced role for directors in this regard.
Rather than mandating such expensive disclosure, which
provides little utility to investors, it seems entirely consistent for
the SEC to propose specific board oversight requirements which
would provide a more direct, effective, and less costly means of
dealing with potential conflicts of interest than the final rules. For
example, the SEC could mandate that fund directors approve
proxy voting policies and procedures. Instead of purchasing
individual stocks and directly voting proxies, investors choose to
invest in mutual funds for, among other things, diversification
and receipt of professional management. Consistent with such
professional management, shareholders would gain the benefit of
the board of directors' direct oversight of a fund management's
exercise of proxy votes consistent with approved guidelines.
Historically, boards of directors have monitored the portfolio
management services provided by the investment advisers of
their funds. 36  As part of these traditional oversight
responsibilities, fund boards have the ability to both monitor
effectively a fund's participation in corporate governance
activities of portfolio companies and promote a fund's active role
Our fund governance initiative was a recognition that the SEC continually
faces the formidable challenge of applying the existing regulatory framework
that helped ensure the integrity of the industry, while providing a regulatory
scheme that can keep pace with the increased competition and the vast
technological changes that have been ongoing in the securities markets. As
we work to keep pace and modernize the regulatory structure to
accommodate the increased competitiveness and globalization of the fund
industry, we will need to increasingly rely on fund directors to vigorously
perform their 'watchdog' duties on behalf of fund shareholders.
Id., available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch470js.htm (last visited
Sept. 10, 2003).
35. See Letter from Craig S. Tyle, supra note 30, at VI.A.2.b.
36. See Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, supra note
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in corporate governance generally. In contrast, while
shareholders are best positioned to monitor their investments and
make decisions with respect to investments in funds,
shareholders are not in a position to provide effective investment
adviser oversight on an operating basis. This is so even when
shareholders know that conflicts exist (for example, when an
investment adviser executes brokerage transactions through an
affiliate). In addition, the proposed disclosure of a fund's proxy
voting record will show only whether and how a fund voted on
particular matters, no more or less. It will not show whether, or
to what extent, a fund is involved in governance activities, and
will not enable shareholders, as a body, to provide any guidance
or oversight to an investment adviser.
2. Applicable Funds
The Investment Company Proxy Release applies to all funds
that invest in "voting securities" and excludes funds that invest
exclusively in non-voting securities, with no de minimis
exception. 37 For example, if a fixed income fund invests a
negligible portion of its assets in a preferred stock that has voting
rights, it would be subject to the final rule and would be required
to make this disclosure in each of its SAIs and annual reports.
But, it is highly unlikely that this information will be relevant to
typical fixed income investors who have little or no expectation
that their fund will acquire an equity investment or such other
voting interest in a portfolio company. By way of further
example, if the issuer of a tax-exempt security held by a
municipal bond fund undergoes a restructuring or bankruptcy
and subsequently issues a voting security, such detailed
disclosure is required by the fund. The final rule should not
apply in these contexts as investors are not concerned with this
information when deciding which fund to acquire or redeem. The
final rule should be modified to provide for a broader exception
for any fund that invests 75 percent or more of its assets in non-
voting securities, e.g., taxable and tax-exempt funds.
37. See Investment Company Proxy Release, supra note 6, at 18.
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3. Broaden the Exposure
The SEC stated in the Investment Company Proxy rule
proposal that "requiring greater transparency of proxy voting by
funds may... benefit all investors and not just fund
shareholders." 38 It is objectionable that the SEC desires to use
mutual funds as the vehicle to effect changes for the benefit of "all
investors." The 1940 Act requires funds to be managed in the
best interests of their shareholders.39 As noted elsewhere, the SEC
has significantly underestimated the costs of compliance with its
proxy voting disclosure rules.40 It is unfair to single out fund
shareholders and force them to bear the burdens of the SEC's
broader objectives. 41
If disclosure of proxy votes is a way to achieve the SEC's goal
of getting institutional investors to be "more engaged"42 then it
would seem that the SEC should want all companies over which
it has jurisdiction to disclose their votes.43 But the SEC has not
required this. Under the Investment Adviser Proxy Final Rule,
advisers are only required to disclose their votes if they are acting
38. Investment Company Proxy Release Proposal, supra note 2, at 17.
39. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(2) (2003).
40. See Letter from Craig S. Tyle, supra note 30, at II.B.
41. For example, an investment manager of ERISA assets is obligated to
keep records of its proxy votes exercised on behalf of the plan to enable the
named fiduciary of the plan to review periodically the actions taken. The
investment manager is not required to disclose its proxy votes to the plan
beneficiaries or otherwise make this information public. According to the
Department of Labor, under ERISA, a named fiduciary that delegates the
management of ERISA assets to an investment manager must periodically
monitor the activities of the investment manager, including decisions made and
actions taken by the investment manager with regard to proxy voting decisions.
In order for the named fiduciary to be able to carry out its monitoring
responsibilities, the proxy voting records must enable the fiduciary to review
not only the investment manager's voting procedure with respect to plan-
owned stock but also to review the actions taken in individual proxy voting
situations. See Department of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin relating to written
statements of investment policy, including proxy voting policy or guidelines, 29
C.F.R. § 2509.94-2.
42. Investment Company Proxy Release, supra note 6, at 17.
43. See Letter from Craig S. Tyle, supra note 30, at VI.A.3.
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as advisors to funds.44 The SEC has made no proposals to require
disclosure by advisers to pension funds, hedge funds or issuers.45
Outside of the SEC's jurisdiction, bank trust departments,
pension plans and insurance companies also have no obligation
to disclose their votes.46
4. Confidentiality
Over the last few years, confidential proxy voting has been
one of the most important corporate governance initiatives
supported by many investor groups. 47 Confidential voting is said
to minimize conflicts of interest by reducing pressure from
management to vote a particular way.48 Now, some of these same
activists and investor groups are among the most vocal
supporters of the new rules requiring investment companies to
disclose proxy votes.49 The new rules make investment companies
the only class of investors prohibited from voting confidentially.50
This will have the effect of subjecting investment companies to
the very pressures and conflicts that the rule proponents have
been concerned about51 Management will be able to retaliate
against funds by limiting access to company personnel.2 Smaller
funds will be even more susceptible to this pressure.5 3 Rules
meant to reduce conflicts of interest will have the opposite effect.
5. Proxy Items Covered
In order to lessen the administrative burden of gathering and
maintaining proxy voting records with respect to every item
acted on by companies in a fund's portfolio, the final rules
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at VI.B.2.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
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should be amended to include a de minimis exception. For
example, no records should be required to be disclosed or
maintained when: (i) the matter to be voted on is routine and
uncontested; (ii) the portfolio security makes up less than one
percent of the fund's portfolio; (iii) the portfolio owns less than
one percent of the security; (iv) or the fund owns an amount
which would require it to comply with Section 13G of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (v) the matter relates to a
portfolio security in an index fund due to its passive investment
characteristics. These types of exceptions would enable funds
and their investment advisers to avoid spending valuable time
and resources on disclosure that is necessarily irrelevant to the
investment decision-making process. By reducing the vast
quantity of the proxy voting record disclosure, shareholders
could focus on the meaningful votes cast by the fund.
6. Proxy Voting Record Disclosure and Format
Funds should maintain information regarding its proxy
voting policies and votes as part of a fund's records, but funds
should not be required to make voting records available to
shareholders. Such records are open to the SEC's inspection and
examination staff, and if there is any material deviation from the
stated proxy voting policies involving conflicts of interest, the
SEC has ample enforcement authority to deal with such
occurrences.
Alternatively, proxy voting record disclosure could be
improved by requiring only voting record summaries (as
recommended by TIAA-CREF, among others), as opposed to
item-specific disclosure. For example, the disclosure could
display an aggregate number of: (i) abstention votes cast,
(ii) votes cast in support of or against management, or (iii) votes
cast as recommended by a third party voting service. In fact, in
the rule proposals the SEC specifically requested comment on
whether this type of formatted disclosure provides relevant and
adequate information. 54  More data organized in a concise,
54. See Investment Company Proxy Release Proposal, supra note 2, at 30-31.
248 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
statistically relevant way may help investors focus on
management's overall voting performance.
7. Politicization Effect
If funds are required to publicly disclose their proxy votes,
the voting process will become politicized and conflicts of interest
will be created55 The agendas of many special interest groups
will often be inconsistent with the goal of maximizing economic
value for shareholders.5 6 Pressure from these groups will
inevitably distract fund management from this goal.57 Threats
from outside groups to withdraw their member's investments
from a fund will create a conflict of interest for a fund manager
who is obligated to vote in the overall interests of shareholders.58
Again, the new SEC rules on investment company proxy voting
will have an effect opposite to what its proponents intend.5 9
8. SAI Disclosure
In light of the proxy voting record disclosure required in
annual and semi-annual reports, it is both duplicative and
unnecessary for disclosure also to be included in SAIs and
inconsistent with the SEC's "plain English" 60 policies established
in 1998. SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt stated in 1997,
As lawyers and regulators have loaded up the prospectus with
more and more information, that document has strayed from
its primary purpose of helping people decide whether to
invest in a particular company or fund. Today, many
prospectuses, by their very length and complexity, tend to
obscure the essential information that would help people
make investment decisions.
55. See Letter from Craig S. Tyle, supra note 30, at VI.B.3.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporate Finance,
Updated Staff Legal Bulletin No. 7, Plain English Disclosure (Jun. 7,1999).
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One of the main targets of our Plain English initiative is the
SEC itself. We recognize that we share responsibility for the
state of the modem prospectus. Our passion for full disclosure
has resulted in fact-bloated reports, and prospectuses that are
more redundant than revealing. It turns out that more
disclosure does not always mean better disclosure and that -
especially in an environment that virtually inundates us with
data - too much information can be as much a curse as too
little.61
Through the "plain English" policies, the SEC promoted fund
disclosure documents that effectively communicated essential
information to investors, i.e. by focusing on information that will
help investors decide whether to invest in a particular fund.62 If
the fund's own shareholder meeting results are not required to be
disclosed in SAIs (but are discussed in annual reports), the SEC
should not require funds to devote greater attention in the SAI of
meetings of underlying security investments.
The SEC noted in a footnote to its proxy disclosure rule
proposals that it did not intend to use disclosure requirements as
a means of regulating conduct of funds, because funds are
already subject to extensive substantive regulation under the 1940
Act.63 However, without adequate discussion, the Investment
Company Proxy Release requires funds to specifically note
whether or not their proxy vote was against management's
view.64 Intentionally or not, this result effectively regulates a
fund's conduct.
As an alternative to the Final Rule to require SAIs to include
a description of the proxy voting policies, the SEC could require a
fund attach its comprehensive proxy voting policies as an exhibit
to the fund's registration statement (in Part C), thereby
61. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Speech to the American Savings Education Council, (July 23, 1997), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/spch171.txt (last
visited Sept 10, 2003).
62. See Registration Form Used by Open-end Management Investment
Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 23064, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 232,
239, 240, 270, 274 (March 13, 1998).
63. See Investment Company Proxy Release, supra note 6.
64. See id. at Form N-PX, Item 1(i).
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eliminating irrelevant SAI disclosure to the investment decision-
making process, and at the same time, assuring that the proxy
voting policies are available on file for SEC examination.
III. INVESTMENT ADVISER PROXY RELEASE
Together with the Investment Company Proxy Release, the
SEC approved the Investment Adviser Proxy Release, pursuant to
which the SEC adopted new Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act).65 Under Rule 206(4)-6,
any exercise of voting authority by a registered investment
adviser on behalf of a client will be deemed fraudulent, unless the
adviser adopts and implements proxy voting policies, describes
to clients and furnishes upon their request, its proxy voting
policies, and discloses to clients how to obtain its proxy voting
record.66
A. Proxy Voting Policies
Rule 206(4)-6 requires advisers to adopt and implement
written proxy voting policies that are "reasonably designed to
ensure that [the adviser] votes client securities in the best interests
of clients." 67 Rule 206(4)-6 also requires that those policies be
described to clients and furnished to the client upon request.68
The Investment Adviser Proxy Release states that advisers may
choose any means to make this disclosure, provided that it is
clear, not "buried" in a longer document, and received by clients
within 180 days after publication.69 For example, the requirement
to describe the adviser's policies could be satisfied by disclosure
in the adviser's brochure furnished to clients.70 However, neither
proposed or final Rule 206(4)-6 provides adequate guidance as to
the SEC's expected content of such "reasonably designed"
65. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2003).
66. See Investment Adviser Proxy Release, supra note 6, at 8.
67. Id. at § 275.206(4)-6(a).
68. Id. at § 275.206(4)-6(b).
69. Id. at 23.
70. Id.
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policies, other than to require that the procedures address
circumstances in which the investment adviser resolves potential
conflicts between the interests of the adviser vis-A-vis its client.71
The Investment Adviser Proxy proposed and final Releases,
however, provide additional direction by "suggesting" that the
procedures identify personnel responsible for (a) monitoring
corporate actions, (b) making voting decisions; and (c) ensuring
that proxies are submitted in a timely manner.72
B. Conflicts of Interest
Although the SEC has required investment advisers to draft
procedures which describe how the adviser resolves material
conflicts of interest when they arise between the adviser's
interests and those of its clients, the SEC did not provide
additional guidance in this important area other than describing a
few circumstances where an adviser may have a material conflict
with its client. 73 Such non-exclusive circumstances include where
an adviser: (i) manages or administers an employee benefit plan
or pension plan for, or provides brokerage, underwriting,
insurance or banking services to, a company whose management
is soliciting proxies; (ii) has a relationship with a company that
may be harmed if the adviser fails to vote in favor of
management; (iii) has a business or personal relationship with
participants in a proxy contest, corporate directors or candidates
for directorships (including where an adviser's officer has a
spouse or other close relative who serves as a director or
executive of a company)7 ; and (iv) receives 12b-1 fees from a
mutual fund as a source of compensation and is solicited by the
fund to vote client proxies approving an increase in fees deducted
from the fund's assets pursuant to the 12b-1 plan.75 The SEC has
71. Id. at § 275.206(4)-6(a).
72. Id. at 14 n.17.
73. Id. at15.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 12 n.15.
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stated that whether a conflict is "material" depends on the facts
and circumstances in a specific situation.7 6
C. Proxy Voting Authorit
There is no debate when the advisory contract explicitly
delegates proxy voting authority to the adviser. However, the
SEC has stated that when an advisory contract is silent, proxy
voting authority may be implied to the adviser if the contract
contains an overall delegation of discretionary authority. 77 It is
strongly suggested that advisers revise advisory contracts or
make some other disclosure to clients if the adviser believes that
the client did not intend to delegate proxy voting authority.78 In
situations where clients request the adviser's advice with respect
to voting certain proxies, such advice may be given without
triggering Rule 206(4)-6 provided the adviser does not have
proxy voting authority.79 However, an investment adviser who
provides proxy voting advice is subject to the Investment
Advisers Act's general anti-fraud provisions and must disclose
any material conflicts of interest, if any, that it may have in
connection with providing the advice8s
An adviser may not resolve conflicts of interest by abstaining
from a vote. Coinciding with its general fiduciary obligations,
advisers must exercise proxy voting authority in the best interests
of the client. Thus, abstaining may indeed resolve the adviser's
conflict of interest but it may not necessarily be in the client's best
interest.81 Although an investment adviser with proxy voting
authority has certain fiduciary obligations, an adviser is not
required to become a "shareholder activist," i.e. an adviser is not
required to "actively engage in soliciting proxies or supporting or
opposing matters before shareholders."8 2 Practically speaking, an
76. Id. at5n.5.
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 10 n.10.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id. at 10 n.11.
81. Id. at 17n.23.
82. Id. at 14 n.19.
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adviser will weigh the costs and benefits to its clients when
determining whether to engage in shareholder activism.83
D. Proxy Voting Records
Rule 206(4)-6 requires investment advisers to disclose to
clients how to obtain the adviser's proxy voting record with
respect to securities held in the client's portfolio.84 Similar to the
disclosure of the adviser's proxy voting policies, the SEC
suggested that this disclosure could be made in the adviser's
brochure. 85 However, unlike the Investment Company Proxy
Release, Rule 206(4)-6 does not prescribe the nature, format, or
scope of the proxy voting record made available to clients.
Without these detailed disclosure requirements, some clients may
request, and put advisers in the unenviable position of producing
voluminous proxy voting records. The SEC stated that it does not
believe it is even necessary to prescribe a client's right to this
information because a "client already has the right to information
about how that client's securities were voted."86
E. Record-Keeping
Rule 204-2 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 has
also been amended to require advisers to keep certain relevant
proxy voting records,87 including the following:
i) the proxy voting policies and procedures required under
Rule 206(4)-6;
ii) a copy of each proxy statement that the investment
adviser receives regarding client securities;
iii) a record of each vote cast by the investment adviser on
behalf of a client;
83. Id.
84. Id. at § 275.206(4)-6(b).
85. Id. at 19 n.26.
86. Id. at 19 n.27. See also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 381.
87. Id. at § 275.204-2(c).
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iv) a copy of any document created by the adviser that was
material to making a decision how to vote proxies on behalf of a
client or that memorializes the basis for that decision; and
v) a copy of each written client request for information on
how the adviser voted proxies on behalf of the client, and a copy
of any written response by the investment adviser to any (written
or oral) client request for information on how the adviser voted
proxies on behalf of the requesting cient.88
This recordkeeping requirement in final form is somewhat
less cumbersome than the proposed language because investment
advisers can satisfy the requirement by relying on a third party to
make and retain copies of proxy statements and records of actual
votes.8 9 Additionally, the Investment Adviser Proxy Release
Proposal would have required investment advisers to keep
records of all "communications received and internal documents"
materially related to the proxy voting decision.90 Several of the
other items already are publicly available for SEC inspection.
F. Proposed Modifications to the Investment Adviser Proxy Release
1. Proxy Voting Policies
First, the SEC should reformulate the ambiguous standard
requiring adoption of proxy voting policies that are "reasonably
designed to ensure that proxies are voted in the client's best
interests."91 Rather, the SEC should adopt the same approach it
followed in the Investment Company Proxy Release and provide
explicit guidance through Rule 206(4)-6 or otherwise in
connection with those areas the SEC expects such policies to
address.
Second, the SEC should clarify its requirement that advisers
provide clients a "description"92 of the adviser's proxy voting
88. Id.
89. Id. at 21-22.
90. See Investment Adviser Proxy Release Proposal, supra note 2, at 25.
91. Investment Adviser Proxy Release, supra note 6, at § 275.206(4)-6(a).
92. Id. at § 275.206(4)-6(c).
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policies. Specifically, the SEC could flesh out Rule 206(4)-6 by
providing direction as to the nature, format, and scope of the
description. Such direction would allow advisers to avoid
burdensome and voluminous client disclosures by stating clearly
that the disclosure should be limited to a brief description. Rule
206(4)-6 already entitles clients to be furnished with their
adviser's complete proxy voting policies upon their request, to
the extent any clients express an interest in obtaining additional
information.93
2. Proxy Voting Record
The Investment Adviser Proxy Release requires advisers to
provide proxy voting records to clients upon their request.94 This
requirement should be limited to instances where the assembly of
the information is reasonable and feasible. Moreover, the proxy
voting information sent to requesting clients should be limited to
a format as noted above regarding the disclosure of actual proxy
voting records required to be provided by open-end and closed-
end funds.95
3. Securities of Privately Held Companies
The SEC's new rule 206(4)-6 and all related discussion is
silent as to whether it is intended to apply to investment adviser's
votes in connection with privately held securities. This matter
particularly affects advisers who, on behalf of clients, make
venture capital and private equity investments. Notwithstanding
that an adviser who invests in privately held companies may be
solicited to vote on a significantly larger number of items than is
required for most publicly held companies, presumably Rule
206(4)-6 applies equally to privately held companies. Such
clarification from the SEC, perhaps in a disclosure format of
"Frequently Asked Questions" is appropriate.
93. Id.
94. Id. at § 275.206(4)-6(b).
95. See discussion supra Part II.D.6.
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